Abstract: This paper concentrates on the detection of steganography in inactive frames of low bit rate audio streams in Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) scenarios. Both theoretical and experimental analyses demonstrate that the distribution of 0 and 1 in encoding parameter bits becomes symmetric after a steganographic process. Moreover, this symmetry affects the frequency of each subsequence of parameter bits, and accordingly changes the poker test statistical features of encoding parameter bits. Employing the poker test statistics of each type of encoding parameter bits as detection features, we present a steganalysis method based on a support vector machine. We evaluate the proposed method with a large quantity of speech samples encoded by G.723.1 and compare it with the entropy test. The experimental results show that the proposed method is effective, and largely outperforms the entropy test in any cases.
Introduction
Steganography is a technique of covert communication by embedding secret messages into seemingly innocent digital media such as audio [1] [2] [3] , image [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] and video [11, 12] . Like other security techniques, such as encryption [13, 14] , the misuse of steganography by lawbreakers will pose a threat to network security and public safety. To confront this challenge, its countermeasure, steganalysis, has received increasing attention. The aim of steganalysis is to detect, extract and destroy the secret messages embedded in digital media, where determining whether the suspicious media contain secret messages is the precondition of other operations [15] .
In recent years, Voice over VoIP has emerged as a popular communication service over the Internet for its convenience and instantaneity. With the widespread application of VoIP, researchers have paid more and more attention to VoIP-based steganography. Compared with traditional carriers, there are many advantages for VoIP-based carriers, such as immediacy, high steganographic bandwidth and alterable steganographic length [15] . In general, VoIP-based steganography can be classified into the following two categories. One employs the relevant protocols of VoIP as carriers, for example, Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski [16] used the redundant data area in session initiation protocol (SIP) to embed secret messages and Forbes [17] created a covert channel by modifying the timestamp in real-time transport protocol (RTP). The other is to embed the secret messages in VoIP payload, which attracted more attention from the research community last decade [15] for its higher steganographic bandwidth. Low bit rate codecs are widely applied in VoIP for its high compression ratio; most of the steganographic algorithms in VoIP payload are conducted on them. For most low bit rate codecs, have been presented. The support vector-machine based steganalysis method is presented in Section 4. Experiments and performance analysis are given in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related Work

Improved VAD Algorithm
ITU G.723.1 [39] is a hybrid codec with two encoding modes: 5.3 kbit/s mode and 6.3 kbit/s mode and each frame is coded into various parameters. The length of each frame of both modes is 30 ms, and the speech bits of each frame are 160 bits with 5.3 kbit/s mode and 192 bits with 6.3 kbit/s mode. The bit allocation of encoding parameters of each frame is listed in Tables 1 and 2. VAD is to determine whether the current frame is active or inactive by comparing the energy of the current frame with a threshold [39] . The inactive state of frames may be affected by steganography, so it is necessary to keep the VAD results of the sender and the receiver consistent. However, the original VAD algorithm is related to the previous frame of the current frame. If the inactive state of the previous frame is impacted by embedding secret messages, the inactive state of the current frame may be also affected when applied original VAD algorithm to detect inactive frames, which leads to an altered VAD result. To solve the problem, Huang et al. [28] improved the algorithm of autocorrelation coefficients, which made the autocorrelation coefficients of the current frame were independent with the previous frame. Then, the stateless coefficients were used to calculate residual energy, which was then compared with the threshold, so the VAD results kept invariable after steganography. Due to the silence compression function being optional for G.723.1 codec and there being some bits in the VoIP packet header to direct whether to use the silence compression function during encoding process, Lin [29] used the one free bit generated by disabling the silence compression function to mark the inactive frames embedded with secret messages. When decoding the VoIP streams at the receiver end, there is no need to run the VAD algorithm again and the secret messages are extracted from the inactive frames that have been marked. 
Steganography in Inactive Frame
Huang et al. [28] and Lin [29] selected the parameters to embed secret messages by evaluating the effects after being modified. There are 101 bits per frame for steganography with 6.3 kbit/s mode, 81 bits per frame for steganography with 5.3 kbit/s mode, and the suitable parameters for steganography are listed in Tables 3 and 4 . The selected parameters are used to embed the secret messages with the following algorithm that involves three steps:
Step 1: Voice activity detection. Speech samples are divided into frames, and each frame is input into the VAD detector, where the inactive frames are marked with a tag.
Step 2: Encoding and embedding secret messages in inactive frames. All frames are encoded without applying silence compression function. If the frame has been marked in Step 1, suitable parameters of the frame will be embedded with secret messages.
Step 3: Encapsulation and send. All the frames are encapsulated in VoIP packets, which are transmitted over the Internet. 
Steganalysis Based on Poker Test
Poker Test [40] is a technique to determine whether a given bit sequence satisfies the characteristics of a truly random sequence. Let X be a bit sequence of length n and m be the length of a subsequence of X such that n m
For a given bit sequence X, it can be divided into k non-overlapping subsequences each of length m, which can be written as k = n m .
Let F i be the frequency of the i-th type of subsequence of length m, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 m . The poker test statistic is defined as
which approximately follows a χ 2 distribution with 2 m − 1 degrees of freedom. In the proposed steganalysis method, each parameter suitable for steganography in all inactive frames can form a bit sequence. The bit sequence can be considered as consisting of a series of subsequences, which can be expressed as
where S j is the subsequence of X of length m. Denote P as the set which contains all the 2 m types of subsequences. Then, the frequency of the i-th type of subsequence can be calculated by
where I(x) is expressed as
Let b i be the i-th bit in X, the probabilities b i = 1 and b i = 0 are denoted as p (b i = 1) and p (b i = 0), respectively; denote the embedding rate as r, the probabilities for b i = 1 and b i = 0 after steganography are p'(b i = 1) and p'(b i = 0), which can be expressed as
By subtracting the above two equations, we can obtain
From Equation (9), it can be concluded that the distribution of 0 and 1 in X tends to be symmetric as the embedding rate increases. When the distribution of 0 and 1 becomes symmetric and the bit sequence is long enough, the values of F i will be nearly equal. For example, let m = 2, there are four types of subsequences ({0,0}, {0,1}, {1,0}, {1,1}) and the probability of each subsequence is approximately equal to 0.25. Based on this, the values of F i satisfy the following equations:
According to the Cauchy-Buniakowsky-Schwarz inequality [41] , we can obtain:
Putting Equation (12) into Equation (3), we can obtain:
However, because the length of X is limited, the value of V is generally non-zero. We can still reach the conclusion from the above analyses that the poker test statistic of X tends to decrease with the increase of the embedding rate. To verify the inference, we calculate the poker test statistics of each parameter suitable for steganography at different embedding rates (from 0.1 to 1.0). Table 5 shows the poker test statistics of each parameter suitable for steganography at different embedding rates with 6.3 kbit/s mode. Apparently, although the embedding secret messages have different effects on different parameter sequences, the poker test statistics tend to decrease with the increase of embedding rate. Therefore, the poker test statistics of each parameter sequence can be applied as steganalysis features. 
SVM-Based Steganalysis Method
In this section, the steganalysis method based on the support vector machine (SVM) has been presented, and the proposed features in Section 3 are employed as the steganalysis features. The steganalysis method includes a training process and a detection process. Specifically, the training process is divided into three steps as follows:
Step 1: Sample preparation. Collect a great quantity of speech samples encoded by G.723.1 with both encoding modes and embed secret messages with the steganography in Section 2.2 at different embedding rates. Similarly, the detection process contains two steps as follows:
Step 1: Feature extraction. Extract the proposed features from the samples to be detected.
Step 2: Decision-making. Input the features extracted in Step 1 into the trained SVM classifier to determine whether the samples to be detected contain secret messages according to the classification results.
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The performances of both the steganalysis methods are evaluated by accuracy (ACC), false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR). The accuracy is the percentage of the samples that are correctly classified in the total of test samples. ACC can be calculated by
where NTP is the quantity of true positives, namely, the quantity of steganographic samples identified as steganographic samples; NTN is the quantity of true negatives, namely, the quantity of cover samples identified as cover samples; NFP is the quantity of false positives, namely, the quantity of cover samples identified as steganographic samples; NFN is the quantity of false negatives, namely, the quantity of steganographic samples identified as cover samples. False positive rate (FPR) is the probability of false positives in the total number of negatives, which can be expressed as
where the sum of NTN and NFP is the total number of negatives, that is, the total number of cover samples. False negative rate (FNR) is the probability of false negatives in the total number of positives, which can be expressed as
where the sum of NTP and NFN is the total number of positives, that is, the total number of steganographic samples. The poker test statistics of all suitable parameters for steganography are calculated with m = 2, which reaches the best detection performance in our experiments and satisfies Equation (1). Since there is no detection method to detect the targeted steganography, we compare our method with the entropy test [38] , which has been already used to detect symmetry [43] and steganography [34, 36] . In the entropy test, all of the parameters suitable for steganography can form a sequence; then, the entropies of the eight types of binary sequences ({0,0,0}, {0,0,1}, . . . {1,1,1}) are calculated respectively as steganalysis features. Employing the entropies of the eight types of binary sequences as steganalysis features reaches the best detection performance in our experiments.
where N TP is the quantity of true positives, namely, the quantity of steganographic samples identified as steganographic samples; N TN is the quantity of true negatives, namely, the quantity of cover samples identified as cover samples; N FP is the quantity of false positives, namely, the quantity of cover samples identified as steganographic samples; N FN is the quantity of false negatives, namely, the quantity of steganographic samples identified as cover samples. False positive rate (FPR) is the probability of false positives in the total number of negatives, which can be expressed as
where the sum of N TN and N FP is the total number of negatives, that is, the total number of cover samples. False negative rate (FNR) is the probability of false negatives in the total number of positives, which can be expressed as
where the sum of N TP and N FN is the total number of positives, that is, the total number of steganographic samples.
Performance and Analysis
In our steganalysis experiments, 2200 ten-second samples are embedded with secret messages at different embedding rates (from 0.1 to 1.0), respectively. Figure 3 shows the experimental results of detection accuracy, FPR and FNR at different embedding rates.
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The results reconfirm that the proposed method has better performance than the entropy test. Moreover, we can get another conclusion from Figure 4 that the proposed method with 5.3 kbit/s mode slightly outperforms that with 6.3 kbit/s mode. 
Conclusions
Steganography of inactive VoIP frames is a state-of-the-art information hiding method for VoIP, which lacks effective countermeasures. To fill this gap, we present a steganalysis method of inactive voice-over-IP frames based on a poker test. Specifically, we analyze the impacts on parameter bits induced by the steganographic process, model the steganalysis feature using the poker test statistics of different parameters, and finally present an SVM based steganalysis method to detect steganography of inactive VoIP frames. We evaluate the proposed method with a large number of speech samples encoded by G.723.1 and compare it with the traditional entropy test. The experimental results show that the proposed method is effective and achieves much better detection performance than the entropy test. 
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